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STUDENT NOTES AND COMMENTS
A MORTGAGE AS A GIFT
THE PROBLEM IN GENERAL
The question as to whether a mortgage may be the subject of
a valid gift presents many problems. The first of these is whether
the gift is good if the mortgage is an undertaking of a third person,
not the donor himself. On the other hand, if the donor is also the
mortgagor, is the mortgage good? Is the result different m the
so-called title states from that reached in the states holding a
mortgage to be a mere lien? In determining the validity of a mort-
gage as a gift all of these questions should be considered.
GIFT OF MORTGAGE WHERE THE DONOR IS
NOT THE MORTGAGOR.
It appears to be well settled that a gift of a mortgage, where
the donor is not the mortgagor, is valid. Pomeroy in his Equity
Jurisprudence states:
"Whatever doubt may have once been entertained,
the rule is now well established that all things in action
which consists [sic] of the promises or undertakings
of third persons, not the donor himself, of which the
legal or equitable title can pass by delivery, may be
the subject of a valid gift, including * :: mortgages
GIFT OF MORTGAGE BY MORTGAGOR-DONOR AT THE COM-
MON LAW AND IN THE SO-CALLED "TITLE-STATES."
At common law a mortgage of real property was defined as an
estate created by a conveyance of the property, absolute in its form,
but which was intended to secure the performance of some act by
the mortgagor, and was to be void if the act was performed agree-
ably to the terms prescribed at the time of making the conveyance.2
In other words, the mortgage created an estate in the mortgagee
which was defeasible upon the performance by the mortgagor of a
condition subsequent. Looking at the problem from the common law
point of view, a mortgage on real estate by way of a gift is just as
effective as a conveyance not on a condition.' In Campbell v. Tomp-
kins the court said:
'4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (5th ed. 1941) sec. 1148.
2 BLACKSTONE COMM. (5th ed. 1820) 157.
'3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) sec. 606; see, Brooks
v. Dalrymple, 94 Mass. (12 Allen) 102 at 194 (1866) Bucklin v.
Bucklin 40 N. Y. (1 Keyes) 141, 1 Abb. App. sec. 242 (1864).
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"It cannot be doubted that even now a valid mort-
gage may be given where no valuable consideration
exists. Otherwise, the absolute control of the owner
over his property is taken away, for he would not be
permitted to give it away in his lifetime by deed. The
mere fact that there was no consideration would not
now render the mortgage invalid. A mortgage may be
sustained as against all except creditors whose clains
existed at the time of giving it, although it was intended
merely as a gift; and, when executed and delivered, it is
not open to the objection that it is a voluntary execu-
tory agreement, but it may be enforced according to its
terms as an executed conditional transfer of the real
estate mortgaged.'
From this it appears that at the common law and in the so-
called "title states" a mortgage is a transfer of a legal interest in
realty, completely executed, not subject to attack because of lack
of legal consideration, and good as the subject of a gift.
GIFT BY MORTGAGOR-DONOR IN "LIEN THEORY" STATES.
It is in the states holding a mortgage to be a mere lien that the
greatest difficulty concerning the subject matter at hand is encoun-
tered. This is largely due to over-reaching decisions by the courts.
In equity, a mortgage is security for a debt," and it is a well
settled rule of the law of mortgages, that the same defenses are
available in an action to foreclose a mortgage, with the exception of
the Statute of Limitations, ' as against the debt it secures. It is
likewise well established that a prerequisite to the validity of the
debt is a valuable consideration,' and, unless the obligation is not so
supported, a mortgage securing such obligation will not be enforced
These rules are correctly applied where the parties intended the debt
as the primary obligation with the mortgage as security therefor.
However, difficulty arises when the rules are applied to cases where
the parties clearly intend the mortgage as a gift.
In the case of Baird v. Baird,0 a father deeded his farm to his
two sons and took back a mortgage for the purpose of protecting the
farm from the sons' improvidence, but he never intended to enforce
the mortgage. The court followed the intention of the parties and
'32 N. J. Eq. 170, 172 (1880) accord, Brooks v Dalrymple, 94
Mass. (12 Allen) 102, 104 (1866).
4 KENT, COMM. (11th ed. 1867) 154; 4 POMEROY, EQurrY JuRis-
PRUDENCE (5th ed. 1941) sec. 1192.
'WALSH, MORTGAGES (1934) 175.
1 JONES, MORTGAGES (6th ed. 1904) sec. 610.
'Barned, Consideration in Mortgages (1931) 19 Ky. L. J. 146,
151.
, Cotton v Graham, 84 Ky 672, 2 S.W 647 (1887), 5 TIFFAwY,
REAL PROPERTY (3rd ed. 1939) sec. 1401.
10 145 N. Y. 659, 40 N. E. 22 (1895) accord, Dexter v Lickten-
walter, 48 N. D. 633, 186 N. W 279 (1921).
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demed foreclosure of the mortgage. It was intimated by the court
that the mortgage might have been valid, had the intention of the
parties been to enforce it. Another case giving effect to the mani-
fested intention of the parties is Goethe v. Gmelin. " There husband
and wife held land by the entirety and executed a note and a mort-
gage on the land to the wife's daughter by way of gift. The devisee
of the surviving tenant sought to have the note and mortgage de-
creed void. The bill of complaint was dismissed and the gift was
held to be valid. In a later case,3 a grandfather executed a mortgage
on land by way of gift to his granddaughter. Later he changed his
mind and brought suit to have the mortgage set aside. It was held
that a mortgage unaccompanied by a note might be the subject-
matter of a gift. The case of Brigham v. Brown" contained a state-
ment that a mortgage intended as a gift would be valid without con-
sideration; however, the mortgage in that case was held to be void
as against a subsequent purchaser for lack of proper recording.
Bucclin v. Bucklin' was clearly put on the ground that a mortgage
intended as a gift was valid even without consideration.
From the cases considered it appears that equity will look to
the intention of the parties and decide the case accordingly. If the
mortgage was intended as a gift, then equity will follow that intent,
so long as the rights of antecedent creditors are not involved. If the
mortgage was intended to be for a consideration and the considera-
tion fails, then the mortgage will not be enforced. It is not at all
surprising that the intention of the parties is the determining factor
in deciding the validity of a mortgage to secure an obligation. The
assertions found in many of the cases to the effect that consideration
is necessary to the validity of a mortgage are misleading since the
requirement of consideration is limited to those cases where the
mortgages are security for an obligation and has no application to
mortgages intended as gifts. Tiffany says that the doctrine of con-
sideration applies to executory contracts only, and a legal mortgage,
even when regarded as a lien merely, is not an executory contract,
but rather an executed one. '
CONCLUSION
It seems well established that a gift of a mortgage by one not
the mortgagor is a valid gift. Where the mortgagor is the donor, the
common law view that a mortgage is a conveyance on a condition
subsequent and hence, can be made the subject of a gift, is un-
assailable upon principle since absolute control of the owner over
256 Mich. 112, 239 N. W 347 (1931).
"Cooklin v Cooklin, 260 Mich. 69, 244 N. W 232 (1932)
44 Mich. 60, 6 N. W 97 (1880).
"40 N. Y. (1 Keyes) 141, 1 Abb. App. sec. 242 (1864).
"5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, (3rd ed. 1939) sec. 1401.
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his property is a necessary incident of ownership. It is not necessary
that the mortgage be security for an enforceable obligation. The view
in .some of the lien theory states, that a mortgage is executory and
a promise to make a gift in the future, is untenable. Even under the
lien theory a mortgage still conveys a legal interest in land, a lien
which may become a title by the decree of the court."0 Even if the
mortgagee cannot get possession until foreclosure, he gets a limited
legal interest in the land mortgaged. This interest, where the mort-
gagee obtains it by way of a gift, should be just as valid as where
he obtains the legal title subject to a condition subsequent by way
of gift at the common law.
WILLIAM 0. GILBREATH
"See, United States v Commonwealth Ins. & Trust Co., 193
U. S. 651 (1904).
